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     By the 1920s the British Empire embraced substantially more 
than half the Muslim peoples of the world. For much of the 
twentieth century Britain was the greatest influence over their 
development. Imperial security in large part dictated which 
territories of former Muslim empires or petty Muslim states the 
British came to rule. Imperial interests in combination with 
those of rival empires and local forces dictated precisely, and 
sometimes not so precisely, where the boundaries of new states 
were to fall. By the same token they dictated which peoples would 
have to learn to live together, or not as the case may be, in the 
increasingly demanding environments of the modern economy and 
modern state. Imperial techniques of government shaped the 
developing politics of these dependencies, often leaving major 
legacies to the years when the British had gone. The British 
Empire was the context in which many Muslims experienced the 
transition to modernity. 
 ***** 
     At the beginning of the assertion of British power in the 
eighteenth century what has been termed the Islamic world system 
was almost at an end.  Long-distance trade, a shared body of 
knowledge, a common legal system, and a common language of 
learning had linked peoples from Africa's Atlantic coast through 
to Central and South Asia. As time went  on their influence had 
reached to the China Sea and island South-East Asia.  According 
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to the pattern of commerce and the play of power great entrepot 
cities flourished from time to time in West Asia and the Eastern 
Mediterranean - Baghdad, Cairo, Istanbul, Isfahan. Ibn Battuta, 
the fourteenth-century Moroccan traveller, who spent twenty-four 
years journeying through this world visiting the territories of 
over forty modern Muslim states and finding employment as a 
judge, attests to the reality of this system. So, too, do those 
eighteenth-century scholars whose pilgrimages to Mecca were made 
from places as far afield as Timbuctu, Sinkiang, and Sumatra. 
     By the late eighteenth century the great empires which had 
dominated the Muslim world since the early sixteenth century were 
either dead or dying. The Safavid was long gone, having crumbled 
in an afternoon before a whiff of Afghan tribal power; the Mughal 
was reduced to a few villages around Delhi; the Ottoman was on 
the retreat but still held authority over much of the Balkans, 
West Asia, and North Africa. The Muslim world, however, was not 
in decline.  Recent research has been at pains to emphasize the 
significant economic and political changes that were taking place 
in some areas: the growth of revenue farming, the spread of 
commercial agriculture, the rise of provincial elites and the 
regionalization of power.(1)  Side by side with these changes 
there was also a religious renewal of quite extraordinary 
vitality. It was expressed in jihad movements which touched 
almost every Muslim land.  This spirit continued with vigour into 
the period of British Empire.  Some of its manifestations 
revealed state-making capacity as in the Wahhabi movement which 
underpinned Saudi power in Arabia, the jihad which led to the 
caliphate of Sokoto in West Africa and that which led to the 
Mahdist state in the Sudan.  Other manifestations came in 
response to the fact of British rule, such as the Islamic 
reformist movement of Deoband in nineteenth-century India or the 
Islamic `fundamentalist' movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
twentieth-century Egypt. 
     The first major step towards British Empire in the Muslim 
  
3
world came in 1765 when the East India Company received from the 
Mughal emperor the right to raise revenue and administer justice 
in the rich province of Bengal.  Subsequent major steps were the 
final defeat of Tipu Sultan, the last signficant Muslim power in 
India, at Seringapatam in 1799, and the defeat of the French at 
Acre in the same year, which secured British command of the 
eastern Mediterranean. From these first steps British power 
expanded through the Muslim world, the process gaining great pace 
between the 1880s and the end of the First World War, when it 
reached from West Africa through the central Islamic lands to 
South-East Asia. In every area the strategic and sometimes the 
economic needs of empire combined with local forces to carve the 
shapes of modern Muslim states, and modern states in which 
Muslims live, out of former Muslim empires, caliphates, 
sultanates, and sheikhdoms. 
     In West Africa, British rule, along with that of the French, 
transformed the situation of Muslim peoples. Up to the end of the 
nineteenth century the savannah region to the south of the Sahara 
had been host to a series of Muslim empires and states which were 
expanding to the south and the west. They had participated in the 
long-distance trade across the desert in slaves, salt, and gold 
and some had been noted both for their wealth and their learning. 
British rule transferred the focus of economic effort towards the 
coast where Africans became involved in the production of cash 
crops - palm oil, cocoa, rubber - for export.  Muslim peoples 
occupied the backlands of the new British colonies of Sierra 
Leone (1891), Gold Coast (1896), and Nigeria (1900). In the last-
mentioned, which was by far the largest and most important, the 
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Hausa Muslims of the north, who had peopled the Fulani caliphate 
of Sokoto, were thrust together from 1914 in one colony with 
people from the central and southern regions whose religions and 
traditions were different. 
     In the Nile valley British economic interests, stemming from 
the development of Egypt's cotton production under the Khedival 
regime, and her strategic interests, stemming from Egypt's 
control of the Suez canal, led to the occupation of the country 
in 1882. Officially declared a protectorate soon after the 
outbreak of war in 1914 mass opposition to British rule from 1919 
had led to a qualified independence in 1922 in which Egyptians 
regained control of their internal affairs but Britain retained 
control of foreign policy, the army, and the canal. The security 
of Egypt, however, was closely bound up with the control of the 
upper Nile valley, the Sudan, where in 1881 the Sufi shaykh, 
Muhammad Ahmad, had led a rising against Egyptian rule and 
established the Mahdist state. This had been conquered by an 
Anglo-Egyptian army in 1898 leading to the formation of an Anglo-
Egyptian condominion in 1899.  From the early 1920s the 
condominion became no more than fiction as the British, with 
Sudanese support, took the administration entirely into their 
hands. In the nineteenth century both the Egyptians and the 
Mahdists had had difficulty in imposing their authority over the 
non-Muslims who lived south of the tenth parallel.  British power 
now held the southern peoples firmly within a Sudanese framework. 
     In East Africa security had led to the British presence in 
Somalia which was divided up with the Italians and the French in 
the late nineteenth century.  Little had been done for the tribes 
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of the region apart from resisting Muhammad `Abd Allah who from 
1899 to 1920 waged a jihad against the British.  Muslim 
communities were established in all the British colonies of the 
region.  Notable was the sultanate of Zanzibar which became a 
protectorate in 1870, while in Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika there 
were Muslim communities formed initially from the Swahili-
speaking peoples who during the nineteenth century had been 
pressing inland from the coast.  Through East Africa from Uganda 
to the Dominion of South Africa there were also Muslims of Indian 
origin, not least among them the Nizari Isma`ili followers of the 
Aga Khan, whose migration the British had encouraged to assist in 
developing the resources of the region. 
     In West Asia, protecting British routes to the East, 
managing the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire, and 
trying to honour the conflicting understandings reached with 
Arabs, Zionists and the French during the First World War led to 
the formation of three new states, all of which were held in 
trust for the League of Nations. There was Iraq whose boundaries 
to the west and south had no rationale in nature. To the north 
the British had insisted in adding the province Mosul from the 
French sphere of influence - a mixed blessing bringing on the one 
hand a mountainous barrier and eventually oil, but on the other 
hand a large population of discontented Kurds. Indeed, Iraq was a 
patchwork of possible identities with Kurds and Turks as well as 
Arabs, with Jews and Christians as well as Shia and Sunni 
Muslims, plus a host of tribal groupings. In 1921 the Hashemite 
prince, Faysal, was established as King to compensate for the 
loss of his Arab state based on Damascus to the French.  There 
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was Palestine, which was carved out of three separate Ottoman 
districts and which for nearly two thousand years had been little 
more than a geographical expression. Here the British had agreed 
to provide the framework within which Zionists could establish 
for themselves a `national home', an ambition which was likely to 
mean some cost to the eighty per cent of the population which was 
Muslim and the ten per cent which was Christian. The third new 
state was Transjordan which had even less basis than the other 
two, as it embraced no administrative region, specific people or 
historical memory.  Originally intended as part of Palestine, it 
became a separate state when in 1921 the British permitted `Abd 
Allah the brother of Faysal to establish a government there in 
part to satisfy his ambition and in part to settle the region. 
     In the Arabian peninsula Britain's interests were primarily 
strategic involving control of the coastline and the routes to 
India. In the Aden protectorates the British policed the region 
from Aden itself while curbing the ambitions of the Zaydi Imams 
who wished to reimpose the authority of the North Yemen over the 
sultanates to the south. Further along the southern Arabian shore 
the Bu Sa`idi sultans of Muscat and Oman ruled with the help of 
British advisers.  In the Gulf the sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, and Trucial Oman had all concluded treaties with the 
British in the nineteenth century and existed underneath the 
umbrella of British power.  In each city state government was a 
family business, their revenues were slight, and the British 
intervened only when necessary. Their boundaries, moreover, in 
the desert world where men exercised authority over men and not 
land, remained ill-defined. 
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     In India British relationships with Muslims did not seem to 
involve statemaking. Nearly half of all the Muslims ruled by the 
British were to be found in the subcontinent, some eighty 
million, yet Indian Muslims were less than thirty per cent of the 
population of the region. Equally Muslims as a whole, as far as 
they considered such matters, did not seem interested in a 
separate political existence, which was hardly surprising as they 
were greatly divided by language, background, and economic 
condition. However, there were aspects of Muslim politics and 
British policies which could point in this direction. Muslims in 
northern India with British encouragement had been concerned to 
focus their energies on the educational initiatives centred on 
Aligarh college. This had provided the platform for the formation 
of an All-India Muslim League whose demands, for separate 
electorates for Muslims and extra representation where they were 
politically important, the British had been willing to include in 
both the Morley-Minto constitutional reforms of 1909 and those of 
Montagu-Chelmsford in 1919.  By the 1920s, however, Muslim 
separatism was a weak force in Indian politics, giving little 
hint of statemaking potential. Nevertheless, a Muslim platform 
existed for those who wished to make use of it. 
     In Malaya between 1874 and 1914 the British had brought nine 
Malay sultanates and three Straits settlements under their 
government. The aim was to create the optimum conditions for the 
rapid economic and commercial development of the land in 
commodities such as sugar, coffee, rubber, and tin.  At the same 
time they aimed to foster the advancement of the Malay people 
within the traditional framework of Malay Muslim society. It was 
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a policy which gave the Malay Muslims the political realm, or at 
least its outward forms; the only area in which the sultans 
exercised effective power was in that of Islam where they took 
the opportunity to develop the centralised administration of 
religious affairs.  On the other hand, immigrants, in large part 
Chinese, held the dynamic economic realm. There was a rapid 
change in the ethnic balance of the population, which by the late 
1920s stood at thirty-nine per cent Chinese and just under forty-
five per cent Malay. 
     In addition to the many areas in which British power was to 
be directly involved in nurturing modern states which were to be 
wholly or in part Muslim, there were others whose modern shape 
was the result either of British influence or of attempts to 
resist it. Arguably the existence of Iran owed much to the 
determination of Britain throughout the nineteenth century to 
preserve the country's independence and to hold back the advance 
of Russian power towards India. It was ironical that Britain's 
refusal to protect the Caspian province of Gilan from Bolshevik 
invasion in May 1920 led to the repudiation of the Anglo-Iranian 
agreement of 1919, which had been her attempt to assert hegemony 
over the land. By the early 1920s a new model army under Riza 
Khan was crushing regional revolts and making sure that the oil-
rich province of Arabistan (Khuzistan) acknowledged the authority 
of Teheran rather than that of Britain.  
     In the case of Turkey it was primarily British power which 
had driven the Ottoman armies back through Syria to the Taurus 
mountains where the 1918 armistice line formed the boundary of 
the new state. Elsewhere British attempts, along with French and 
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American support, to fight Turkish nationalism by supporting 
Greek ambitions in western Anatolia, had come to grief when 
Ataturk's armies drove the Greeks into the sea. The Treaty of 
Lausanne recognised Turkey's frontiers as they were at the 1918 
armistice.   
     In central Arabia the British had initially thought of using 
the father of the Hashemite princes `Abd Allah and Faysal, Sharif 
Husayn of Mecca, as their agent of control. But then they stepped 
back and wisely allowed the local leaders to fight for supremacy. 
The victor was `Abd al-`Aziz ibn Sa`ud the founder of the 
twentieth-century incarnation of the Sa`udi state. British power 
settled the ultimate boundaries of this state, as it established 
the frontiers of Transjordan, Iraq, and Kuwait in the 1920s: 
resisted Saudi attempts to incorporate the Yemen in the 1930s: 
and their ambitions in the Buraimi Oasis in the 1950s. 
       The expansion of British power had by the 1920s come to 
establish, or play a part in establishing, both many states of 
the modern Muslim world and states in which Muslim political 
interests might have a significant role to play. Even in the 
1920s it is possible to discern potential areas of stress: in 
Nigeria and the Sudan there was potential for conflict between 
the Muslim north and the Christian or animist south; on the east 
coast of Africa and in the Malay states there was potential for 
conflict between indigenous peoples and economic immigrants; in 
Iraq the Kurds were already refusing to acknowledge the authority 
of Baghdad; in Palestine Arabs had already rioted against the 
Zionist presence; in India Muslim separatism, it is true, was 
weak, but the Muslim political platform was there to be used and 
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Muslims themselves offered meagre support for Indian nationalism. 
There were many faultlines.  Whether these became open cracks or 
sulphurous craters would depend both on factors outside Britain's 
control and on how Britain ruled her Muslim peoples. 
 ***** 
     British policies in the Muslim dependencies shaped their 
political development. These were in part dependent on cost, and 
given the limited resources of many territories this had to be 
low, in part dependent on those nostrums which found favour with 
officialdom, and in part dependent on British attitudes to the 
Muslim world. To these attitudes we now turn. 
     The British came to the Muslim world with attitudes formed 
by the rhetoric of Europe's long encounter with Islam.  There was 
the Christian polemic against Islam with its accusations that 
Muhammad was an impostor, that his faith was spread by violence, 
that it endorsed sexual freedom on earth and promised sensual 
bliss in heaven. These accusations were sustained by nineteenth-
century missionaries who added to them issues such as the 
position of women and the existence of slavery. There was memory 
of the crusades which influenced many a British speech regarding 
the Ottoman empire down to 1920 and doubtless the odd decision 
such as Lloyd George's determination in that year to join France 
and the USA in letting the Greeks loose in Asia Minor.  There was 
a religious romanticism which gave a special meaning, for some at 
least, to events such as the capture of Jerusalem in 1917 and the 
creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. 
     On the other hand, there was the Enlightenment response to 
the Muslim world in which it became a marvellous store of 
opportunities not just to test Christian certainties but also to 
let the imagination roam. Galland's translation of the Arabian 
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Nights in 1704, alongside growing numbers of travellers' tales, 
whetted the appetite for caliphs, genies, lamps, and fabulous 
happenings.  The taste was developed by writers and musicians, 
poets and painters, reaching one of its apogees in the early 
decades of the twentieth century in the poetry of that 
unsuccessful member of the Levant consular service, James Elroy 
Flecker, and the films of Rudolf Valentino.  Great were the 
possibilities of flowing robes and Muslim headgear whether it was 
Cambridge undergraduates hoaxing the civic authorities that they 
were the Uncle of the Sultan of Zanzibar and his entourage in    
1905 (2)  or T. E. Lawrence playing out his fantasies in the 
Arabian desert in the First World War. Amongst the problems of 
this exotic essence with which things Muslims were bestowed was 
the fact that it made Muslims seem more different, and perhaps 
less able to accept change, than was in fact the case. 
 
     Against this background British understandings of the 
Muslims they ruled were developed.  One which was widespread in 
India and Africa in the late nineteenth century was that Muslims 
were fanatics, prone to holy war against non-Muslims, and 
therefore difficult to reconcile to British rule. This view had 
its origins in the various jihad movements, which the British 
encountered in early nineteenth century India, it was kept alive 
by the Mutiny rebellion, which was considered, wrongly, to be a 
Muslim conspiracy, and it was not laid to rest by W. W. Hunter's 
famous tract The Indian Musalmans written in answer to the 
Viceroy's question `Are the Indian Muslims bound by their 
religion to rebel against the Queen?' In the late nineteenth 
century Indian administrators continued to regard Muslim 
fanaticism, and for some the word Muslim was usually accompanied 
by the term fanatic, as the greatest danger to British rule. This 
understanding of Muslims was translated into Africa in the 1880s 
in discussions of `Arabi Pasha's revolt in Egypt and the Mahdist 
rising in the Sudan.  It was nourished by the jihads which 
spluttered into existence from time to time in the early decades 
of the twentieth century in French and Italian as well as British 
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African territories.  The use of the blanket term `fanaticism' 
often concealed an unwillingness, and perhaps an inability, to 
analyse what was really taking place in Muslim societies.  It 
also meant that Muslims as Muslims tended to be seen as a 
problem, and frequently as a force to be propitiated. 
      Closely connected to the fear of Muslim `fanaticism' was 
the fear of Pan-Islamism, of united Muslim action against the 
British Empire. The British were right not to dismiss the threat. 
 In principle, though to no great extent in fact, Muslims could 
regard themselves as one community and the Ottoman caliph as the 
successor of Muhammad as a leader of that community.  There had 
always been networks of scholars and mystics across the Islamic 
world. Such connections were reinforced in the nineteenth century 
by the increasing numbers of Muslims performing the pilgrimage to 
Mecca and travelling in general.  From the late nineteenth 
century knowledge of other Muslim societies was greatly increased 
by the growth of the press notably in India and Egypt.  Moreover, 
there was an influential Islamic thinker, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
(d.1897) who was arguing for a pan-Islamic response to the 
incursion of the West into the Muslim world.  On top of this 
there was the policy of the Ottoman empire under `Abd al-Hamid II 
to foster connections with Muslims in British territories, 
whether they be in Cape Town, Zanzibar, or Bombay.  The 
government of India, furthermore, was left in no doubt about the 
pan-Islamic feelings of its Muslims as they protested with 
increasing vigour at the Western takeover of the central Islamic 
lands. Their protests reached a peak in the Khilafat movement of 
1919-24, which was the greatest movement of protest against 
British rule since the Mutiny rebellion.  From 1920 the 
government of India urged London to take into account Indian 
opinion in negotiating Turkish peace terms.  Curzon and Lloyd 
George refused to be influenced; in 1922 the Secretary of State 
for India, Montagu, was forced to resign on the issue.  The 
eventual decline of the Khilafat movement proved Curzon and Lloyd 
George right.  Pan-Islamism, as Harcourt Butler often told his 
Indian colleagues, was `more a feeling than a force'. (3) 
     Respect for Muslims as a former ruling people was another 
somewhat different aspect of British attitudes.  It mingled with 
the sense that Muslims such as these were not unlike the British 
- upright and independent peoples, believers who worshipped one 
God, experienced in the work of government and courageous in that 
of war.  Indeed, there was a tendency for British officers, so 
often successful examinees who aspired to gentry status, to be 
over-impressed by the company they kept, whether it was the 
rulers of vast acres or those with summary power of life or death 
over many men. Aspects of such attitudes were explicitly 
expressed in two of the more fateful policies adopted in the 
early twentieth century.  Thus, Lord Lugard spoke admiringly of 
the Fulani in fostering indirect rule in northern Nigeria 
referring to `their wonderful intelligence, for they are born 
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rulers'.(4)   In not dissimilar vein Lord Minto in replying to 
the famous deputation of Muslim nobles, landowners and ministers 
of native states in 1906, whose initiative was to lead to the 
establishment of a separate Muslim political identity in British 
India, referred to the deputees as `descendants of a conquering 
                  
and ruling race'.(5) 
     Such evidence suggests clear links between British attitudes 
to Muslims and policy.  Of course, all attitudes were bound to be 
modified by context whether rhetorical or real.  Gladstone, for 
instance, thought Turks totally unqualified to rule the 
Christians of the Balkans but perfectly qualified to rule the 
peoples of Egypt, a good number of whom were Christian.  British 
Indian administrators adopted a totally different attitude to the 
so-called `aristocratic' Muslims of upper India as compared with 
the peasant cultivators of east Bengal.  Nevertheless, the all-
pervasive impact of British attitudes is striking, whether 
deployed through forms of indirect rule or the great example of 
direct rule, namely India. 
     In much of the Muslim British Empire in the 1920s and 1930s 
forms of indirect rule were in place. In northern Nigeria the 
British ruled through the sultan of Sokoto, his emirs, and the 
structure of Islamic government that existed under their 
authority.  In Egypt the situation was rather more complex.  
British influence depended on the endemic rivalry between the 
King and the Wafd, the support of the large landlords of the 
Delta and the mercantile interests which benefited from the 
British connection, and the presence of British troops.  In the 
northern Sudan from the 1920s the British made a concerted 
attempt to rule through tribal and rural chiefs, but by the mid-
1930s had discovered that these men had less authority amongst 
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their people than they expected; they were then forced to deal 
directly with the urban elites. In the Gulf and along the south 
Arabian shore, influence was exercised through sultans, emirs and 
shaykhs with the use of the odd adviser, the dispatch of 
gunboats, and a touch of airpower. In Transjordan British will 
was exercised through the Hashemite emir, `Abd Allah, and British 
subsidies as well as the British-officered Arab Legion on which 
he depended.  In Iraq that will was also felt through the 
Hashemite monarch, the core of ex-Ottoman officials who had 
supported the Arab nationalist cause, the tribal shaykhs, and the 
large landowners whom the land and water legislation of the 1930s 
made into rich and even larger landowners.  In Malaya the British 
maintained the fiction of ruling through sultans while taking 
into their hands anything needed to enable rapid economic growth. 
 Palestine, however, offers an exception. Here a form of indirect 
rule was developed through the Jewish Agency set up by Article 4 
of the Mandate. When the British offered the Arabs a similar 
agency in 1923, unwisely they turned it down.  They were ruled 
directly. 
     The general outcome of British policies of indirect rule or 
influence was to privilege conservative elements in the modern 
state systems of these societies as they developed.  Islamic law, 
for instance, in its more conservative forms continued to be 
applied.  In northern Nigeria it continued down to 1960 with the 
exception that inhumane punishments were banned. Even slavery was 
permitted to exist. In Malaya it achieved greater application as 
the sultans centralized Islamic religious organization and 
extended its control over village religious life. Forms of rule 
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were supported which had difficulty in incorporating new elements 
into the political system.  In Transjordan, Iraq, and Egypt the 
monarchies, even though the latter two had Parliaments of a kind, 
had difficulty in expanding their base of support to embrace the 
new social groups which were being mobilized by economic change. 
 As always the nature of government helps to fashion the quality 
and style of opposition. In Malaya it was in part the Islamic 
reform of the Kaum Muda; in Egypt it was in part the nascent 
Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The main opposition, 
however, came from the new western-educated classes - government 
servants, army officers, lawyers - who wanted to break their way 
into the charmed circles which wielded state power.  Their 
success depended in large part on the pressures generated by 
economic change, the management skills of those in power, and the 
impact of the Second World War. 
     There are, however, some specific outcomes of policies of 
indirect rule, or influence, which command attention. In states 
where Muslims formed only part of the population they led to 
uneven development which stored up major problems for these 
societies at or soon after independence.  Take Nigeria, for 
example, the home in a technical sense of indirect rule. The 
special policies directed towards the north meant that by the 
time of independence in 1960 only a small fraction of the 
population had been exposed to Western and secular values as 
compared with the peoples of the east and south. The overall 
impact of the British presence, not least the rapid growth of 
commercial agriculture, had led to the consolidation of Islam at 
the centre of popular identity; northern leaders conducted their 
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own relations with Muslim states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
Ahmadu Bello's attempt to `northernize' government and commerce, 
which also meant to `Islamize' them, was to be expected once 
British restraints had been lifted.  It led to fear amongst the 
Christian peoples of the south, his assassination in 1966, and 
the subsequent Biafra civil war. The advance of Islam remains a 
continuing threat to Nigeria's secular and pluralist 
constitution. 
     The Sudan offers similarities to but also differences from 
the Nigerian situation. The imposition of indirect rule led to 
the total isolation of the southern non-Muslim province from 
Arab-Islamic influences from the north.  It was the only way the 
British felt they could build up the self-contained tribal units 
which the system of rule required.  At the same time Christian 
missionaries were given relatively free rein in the area.  The 
outcome was that the two halves of the country grew apart.  The 
Muslim north kept pace with the social and political advance of 
the wider Muslim world; the increasingly Christian south remained 
isolated and immobile.  At independence in 1956 the peoples of 
the south were placed in the hands of the northerners. This was 
followed by continuing friction between Christian south and 
Muslim north leading to the outbreak of civil war in 1967, which 
has continued on and off into the 1990s. 
     In Malaya the British had themselves to deal with the early 
consequences of their policies towards the Malay sultanates.  
After the Second World War, they found that the only way they 
could devolve power with Malay agreement was to ensure Malay 
supremacy in the political and administrative sphere.  An 
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enduring tension came to be established in the modern Malay state 
between the privileged position of the Malays and the recognition 
of Islam in the national identity on the one hand, and the 
position of the non-Muslim Chinese and Indians on the other. It 
was a tension which was on occasion to break into open strife. 
     In other areas it is possible to see how specific policies 
of indirect rule gave a distinctive shape or quality to the 
modern state which emerged.  In the Gulf British policies of 
recognising the Gulf sheikhdoms as separate entities enabled the 
emergence of the larger ones as individual states at 
independence. The British also protected them from the claims of 
their overmighty neighbours, for instance, those of Iraq over 
Kuwait and Iran over Bahrain.  Indeed, they created the 
environment in which these family-run small businesses could, as 
the wealth from oil began to flow in the l950 and l960s, develop 
as family-run modern state corporations.  In Jordan, where the 
British-officered Arab Legion had played such a distinctive role 
in establishing the state and where the dismissal of these 
officers in 1956 signalled the rapid diminution of British 
influence, the army continued to play the role of chief pillar of 
the Hashemite monarchy.  It saved the regime in the great Arab 
nationalist crisis of 1955-58; it did the same in the Palestinian 
crisis of 1967-70. 
     No form of indirect rule had such a momentous outcome for 
the peoples of the region as that conducted in Palestine. 
Arguably the transformation of the Jewish Agency of 1920 into the 
Israeli state by May 1948 was from the beginning a possible 
outcome of the terms of the Palestine mandate.  Britain had 
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undertaken, although against the grave reservations of the 
Foreign Office and her military administration in Palestine, to 
create `such political, administrative and economic conditions as 
will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home',(6) 
and this is what emerged, albeit in nation-state form. But 
Britain's declared policy to the bitter end, with the one 
deviation of the Peel Commission recommendations, was to 
establish a bi-national state. The administration of the mandate, 
however, and the outcome, were disasters. Admittedly, few could 
have predicted when the first High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, 
took up his post in 1920 the events which so complicated 
Britain's rule: the levels of Jewish immigration resulting from 
persecution in Europe, the levels of Arab intransigence resulting 
from justifiable anger and poor leadership, the impact of the 
Second World War, the holocaust, the rise of American influence, 
and the decline of British influence. By the mid-1930s the 
Palestinian Arabs were radical, politicized, organized and using 
strikes and violence.  From 1937-39 there was open rebellion in 
particular against the recommendation of the Peel Commission that 
Palestine be partitioned and in general against the British 
presence. The Palestinian plight attracted popular concern as 
well as that of intellectuals and students in Egypt, Iraq and 
other Arab countries.  The cause was also adopted by Islamic 
movements; Arab governments discovered they could win support by 
taking up the Palestinian issue. Nor was concern restricted to 
Arab lands. Palestine remained a continuing issue for Indian 
Muslims and featured regularly, for instance, in emotional 
speeches and resolutions of the All-India Muslim League. By 1947 
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Palestine was an economic and strategic liability for the 
British. There seemed, moreover, to be no solution agreeable to 
Zionists and Americans on the one hand and the Arabs on the 
other.  In February 1947 the British referred the problem to the 
United Nations, refused to implement a UN partition plan of 
November 1947, and surrendered the mandate on 1 May 1948..  The 
consequence of this imbroglio was a serious loss of goodwill from 
the Arab world towards Britain at a time when her position in 
that world depended on that very commodity. There was also the 
establishment of the Palestinian grievance which was to be a 
focus of relations between regional powers and super powers in 
the region for decades.  At the same time, Israel, which was seen 
as a stake of Western provenance thrust into the heartland of 
Islam, was throughout the Islamic world a focus of resentment 
against the West. 
     If the outcome of British policy failures in Palestine was 
to help shape the political landscape of West Asia for years 
after independence, the same can be said for their impact on 
South Asia. Here, the Princely States apart, the British were 
involved in direct rule. The classic Indian nationalist analysis 
of their ruling style was that the British divided Muslims from 
Hindus and ruled.  Matters, however, were rather more complex.  
Certainly, British attitudes and British policies helped the 
development of Muslim organizations in northern India, but other 
crucial factors were the impact of both Muslim and Hindu 
revivalism. This said, Muslim separatism was a weak growth in the 
1920s and 1930s and its political party, the Muslim League, did 
very badly in the 1937 general elections, winning rather less 
than a quarter of the Muslim seats available.  That this party 
was able to be a serious player in the endgame of British India 
was because it won over four-fifths of the Muslim seats in the 
1945-46 elections. Its fortunes had been transformed by the 
Second World War, the British need for Muslim support in that war 
(half the Indian army, for instance, was Muslim), the mistakes of 
the nationalist movement, and the leadership of Jinnah, the 
Muslim League's president.  Ultimately, as Ayesha Jalal has 
revealed, India was divided because the Indian nationalists 
wished it.(7)   The dynamics of the process were instinct in the 
federal system set up by the 1935 Government of India Act.  The 
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nationalists wanted to inherit the strong central power wielded 
by the British. The Muslim League wanted a weak centre, indeed 
Nationalist-Muslim parity there, to protect the Muslim provinces 
from an over-mighty centre.  Ultimately the nationalists insisted 
on partition. The emergence of Pakistan was the outcome of a 
combination of forces. With regard to the specifically British 
contribution, certainly British attitudes and policies had their 
part to play in establishing a Muslim political platform.  But in 
the final act weight must be given to the dynamics of a federal 
system set up to enable the British to wield all the powers they 
needed in India from the centre while allowing Indians to get on 
with the business of government in the provinces.  The 
consequences of partition have loured over the subcontinent since 
1947, bringing three wars and threatening more. 
 ***** 
     Muslim attitudes to the British varied according to their 
particular Islamic understandings and to their particular 
experience of British rule.  They were subject, too, to change 
through time; the kind of person who was a cultural collaborator 
in the late nineteenth century was more than likely to be a 
dedicated nationalist opponent well before the mid-twentieth 
century.  There were, nevertheless, some distinctive aspects to 
Muslim attitudes.  The British were often seen primarily as 
Christians. Certainly they were people of the book, people who 
shared the same prophetic tradition, but by the same token they 
were people whose scriptures had been corrupted and whose beliefs 
were misguided.  Early contacts could involve set-piece debates 
with Christian missionaries like those which were held at Agra 
(India) in 1854, one of whose Muslim protagonists became a 
pensioner of the Ottoman sultan and the formulator of the most 
                                                               
influential modern Muslim critique of Christianity.(8)   At their 
most extreme religious strategies for dealing with the Christian 
presence might involve attacking Christian revelation at its 
heart, as did the Punjabi Muslim, Ghulam Ahmad (d.1908), who 
founded the Ahmadiyya missionary sect.  He claimed that he was 
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the messiah of the Jewish and Muslim traditions; the figure known 
as Jesus of Nazaareth had not died on the cross but survived to  
die in Kashmir.(9)   But equally the problem of Christian power 
could be confronted with humour, as did the Indian satirist Akbar 
Allahabadi (d. 1921) 
     The Englishman can slander whom he will 
     And fill your head with anything he pleases 
     He wields sharp weapons, Akbar. Best stand clear! 
     He cuts God himself into three pieces. (10) 
 
     A second set of attitudes focused on the extent to which the 
manners and customs of the British could be followed and their 
material culture adopted. Thus, the Sultan of Pahang, `Abd al-
Samad (d.1898) declared that he never `fired an English gun in 
his life nor wished to fire one, that he preferred walking to 
driving and eating with his fingers, according to Malay custom, 
to the use of forks; that wine was forbidden by the Koran and 
                                             
that he did not know how to play the piano.'(11)   For most of 
British rule Muslims debated what they could and could not accept 
from the culture of their ruler.  Wine and pork were for 
believing Muslims distinctive cultural markers; the freedom of 
women was a greatly contested issue. Tables and chairs, knives 
and forks, trousers and ties, however, came widely to be adopted, 
although ties went out of fashion in the late twentieth century 
when it came to be thought that they represented the sign of the 
cross. 
     A third set of attitudes embraces responses to British 
power. The context is crucial.  Muhammad `Abd Allah of Somaliland 
waged jihad for twenty-one years against the British. He 
celebrated the death of a British officer who had tried to cut 
off his defeat in 1913 thus: 
     O Corfield, you are a traveller who 
     Will not stay long here below 
     You will follow the path where there is no rest 
     You are among the Denizens of Hell 
     You will journey to the Next World. (12) 
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In different circumstances, where the fact of Britain's dominance 
was indisputable, there could be resigned acceptance.  `They hold 
the throne in the hand', declared Akbar Allahabadi, `the whole 
realm is in their hand.  The country, the apportioning of man's 
livelihood is in their hand ... The springs of hope and fear are 
in their hand. ... In their hand is the power to decide who shall 
be humbled and who exalted.'(13)   But then there were Muslims 
who genuinely gloried in the destiny they shared with their 
foreign ruler.  Take Sayyid Husayn Bilgrami (d.1926), the 
distinguished Hyderabadi civil servant who had the major hand in 
drafting the Indian Muslim memorial to the Viceroy in 1906. In 
verse of impeccable loyalty, but questionable merit, entitled 
`England and India' he trumpeted: 
     England! 'tis meet that for weal and woe 
     In calm or storm, our chosen place should be 
     Where honour calls us by the side of thee 
     Thy friend be friend to us, our bitt'rest foe 
     The trait'rous knave who schemes thy overthrow. (14) 
     There are, however, some lines of Muslim response which 
require more detailed examination.  The first is that of jihad.  
For all the fear of Muslim fanaticism displayed by the British, 
once they had conquered a territory and consolidated their rule, 
jihad, although often a worry, was rarely a serious issue.  One 
reason was that in British territories which experienced forms of 
indirect rule Islamic law continued to operate. Even in directly-
ruled British India Muslim personal law, the most cherished 
element of the shari`a, continued to be imposed in its bastard 
Anglo-Muhammadan form.  It had long been the position of Sunni 
`ulama that, if the law was upheld, rebellion could not be 
justified.  A second reason was that legitimately to conduct a 
jihad there had to be a reasonable chance of success. After 
Muslims had tasted the fruits of the Gatling gun and had come to 
appreciate the full weight of British power, they knew that they 
had little chance. Once this was understood, the alternative was 
hijra or flight from the `land of war', as practised by the 
Caliph of Sokoto after the annexation of his territories, or the 
30,000 Indian Muslims who in 1920 fled to the Northwest Frontier, 
many to their deaths, as part of the Khilafat protest. 
Considerations such as these help to explain the failure of 
Muslims in Africa and elsewhere to respond to the Ottoman call 
for jihad against the British Empire on the outbreak of the First 




     The spirit of Islamic renewal which was no longer channelled 
into holy war now came to energize other responses to the British 
presence. The broad `church' known as reformism was one. Amongst 
its more striking manifestations was the Deoband Madrasa of 
northern India, from which stemmed the Deoband movement. In this 
`ulama created a way of being Muslim without the support of the 
state.  Spreading knowledge of how to be a good Muslim was 
central to its purposes so it made good use of the printing 
press, of translation of texts into local languages, and of 
schools - by its centenary in 1967 it claimed to have founded 
over 8,000.  Also central to its purpose was personal 
responsibility in putting Islamic knowledge into practice; the 
movement, therefore, was profoundly opposed to any idea of 
saintly intercession for man with God.  To ensure its 
independence of the colonial state, it relied on popular 
subscription for support.  Bureaucratic in organization, one of 
the ways it served its constituency was by offering a mail-order 
fatwa service. Most followers of Deoband supported the Indian 
nationalist movement and opposed the idea of Pakistan; they felt 
                                                                
they did not need a Muslim homeland to be their kind of 
Muslim.(16) Elsewhere no one went as far as Deoband in developing 
organizational structures to support what has been called a form 
of `Islamic Protestantism'. In West Africa, however, ignoring the 
foreigner was a not uncommon response to the British presence. 
     For the most part Muslims could not ignore the British 
presence.  They had to address the meaning of the new forces 
which were having such an impact on their lives: Western 
learning, the colonial state, and major economic change.  This 
process led to the development of what is termed Islamic 
modernism. An important figure in this response to the West was 
the Egyptian, Muhammad `Abduh (d. 1905), who, after participating 
in `Arabi Pasha's revolt, was exiled in the years 1882-88 and 
returned to be chief mufti of Egypt from 1889 to 1905.  He 
accepted the Quran and Hadith as God's guidance for man but made 
other areas subject to man's personal reasoning. He wished to put 
an end to blind acceptance of past authority; Islam had to re-
interpreted in each new generation.  Thus, he threw open the door 
to new ideas.  These led through his intellectual successor, 
Rashid Rida, who talked in terms of the compatibility of Islam 
and an Arab national state, towards a purely secular 
                                                             
nationalism. (17)  `Abduh's ideas were particularly influential 
in North Africa and Southeast Asia.  In Malaya they informed 
those of the Kaum Muda or `Young Faction' whose leaders had 
extensive contacts with West Asia, several studying in Cairo.  In 
the second and third decade of the twentieth century they 
attacked the traditional Islam of the rural `ulama and Sufis 
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which was now administered by the sultans.  After the fashion of 
Islamic reform they criticized all practice which hinted at 
intercession, but equally they looked to a positive approach to 
issues such as the wearing of European clothes or whether it was 
possible to take interest from a post office or a rural co-
operative. Such assaults on the religious fiefdoms of the Malay 
Sultans were at one remove assaults on the British. By the 1930s 
Kaum Muda formed a nationalist opposition. (18) 
                                                        
     The most clearly defined example of Islamic modernism was 
that created by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), the founder of 
Aligarh College (1875), and his followers in the Aligarh 
movement. The Sayyid, who was knighted by the British in 1877, 
was determined that Indian Muslims should come to terms with 
British rule.  They needed to be able to command Western learning 
so he provided them with a Muslim-controlled environment for 
learning, which was modelled after a Cambridge college and in 
which they were taught by men from Cambridge. They needed to be 
able to play a role in the affairs of the colonial state, so he 
made sure that they knew how to debate Cambridge Union style, how 
to play cricket, and how to behave at tea parties.(19)   Again, 
they needed to have as few religious obstacles to the process as 
possible so he used his personal reasoning, rejected the 
authority of the past, and strove to produce an Islamic theology 
for his time. The Quran and Hadith were reviewed in the light of 
modern science.  In the process the Sayyid went much further than 
Muhammad `Abduh, further than most Muslims would go today. 
Muslims went to Aligarh in spite of rather than because of Sayyid 
Ahmad's views. Many became leading supporters of Muslim 
separatism and the movement for Pakistan.(20) 
 
     The person, however, who brought Sayyid Ahmad's project 
close to fruition was not a student from Aligarh, although he was 
subject to Cambridge influence having done graduate work there 
from 1905-08. This was Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), the philosopher-
poet of Lahore, who was knighted in 1923.  He not only developed 
a dynamic vision of Islamic history as one of progress but also 
fitted the nation-state into that progress.  At the same time he 
performed the key service of building a bridge between the 
Islamic idea of the sovereignty of God on earth and that of the 
sovereignty of the people as expressed in the modern state.  
Addressing the Muslim League in 1930 he declared that the Muslims 
were a separate nation in India and that the north-west of India 
should be formed into a Muslim state.(21) 
     By the late 1920s and 1930s groups of Muslims were coming 
forward who could not accept the way forward of the reforming 
`ulama, because they ignored the facts of life, and could not 
accept that of the modernists and their nationalist successors, 
because they ignored the facts of Islam. These Muslims formed 
movements which have been called `fundamentalist' but which are 
better called Islamist.  They are well represented by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna (d.1949) in Egypt in 1928, 
and the Jama`at-i Islami founded by Sayyid Abul A`la Mawdudi 
(d.1979) in India in 1941.  For men such as these the real danger 
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was less British or Western power than the secular culture which 
came with it.  What was needed was to capture the modern state 
and to use it to impose Islamic law and values on society as a 
whole. In Egypt in the late 1940s the Brotherhood was to play a 
leading role in the cause of Palestine and the struggle against 
British rule.  In the subcontinent the Jama`at opposed the Muslim 
League's campaign for Pakistan; it did not believe that it would 
be an Islamic state. These movements were the forerunners of 
those which throughout the former British Empire, indeed 
throughout the Muslim world, would in the latter half of the 
twentieth century compete with the nationalists for the control 
of state power. (22) 
     We should note that these modernist and Islamist responses 
were at the level of the state. For the most part Muslims wanted 
to take over the state structure that British rule had created 
for them.  Where they did not, it was because they felt these 
structures left them too disadvantaged.  In the case of British 
India, they ended up by creating a separate state, which could 
embrace most, though not all, of them. In the case of Palestine, 
they could see no solution from which they would not lose. Of 
course, Muslims under their various British regimes were 
concerned about events in the wider Muslim world; Palestine was 
rarely far from their minds. But the prime focus of actions 
remained the state. As Muhammad Iqbal wrote: 
     Now brotherhood has been so cut to shreds 
     That in the stead of community 
     The country has been given pride of place  
     In man's allegiance and constructive work. (23) 
 
     In spite of the poet's justified complaint there were supra-
state responses to the expansion of British Empire across the 
lands of Islam. There was no shortage of pan-Islamic sentiment.  
In 1894 the Muslims of Lagos were in correspondence with the 
Ottoman Sultan, in 1910 Friday prayers in Dar el Salaam were 
still being said in his name, while pan-Islamic sympathies were 
evident in Malaya from the 1890s. Such feelings were most 
powerfully expressed in India, where the circulation of Muslim 
newspapers always shot up when there were crises in the Islamic 
world, where poets and writers embraced pan-Islamic themes not 
least amongst them the fate of Muslim Spain which carried heavy 
symbolism for the times, and where there was a powerful emotional 
identification with the heartlands of Islam - the Khilafat 
leader, Mahomed Ali, confesses in his autobiography how he 
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contemplated suicide in the autumn of 1912 when he heard that the 
Bulgarians were within twenty-five miles of Istanbul. (24)  It 
was men of this ilk who sent a Red Crescent mission to Turkey in 
1912, founded a society to defend the holy places in 1913, and 
led pan-Islamist activities throughout the 1920s, focusing in 
turn on the Khilafat, the fate of the holy places under Ibn 
Sa`ud, Palestine and the establishment of a university for the 
Islamic world.(25) 
 
     Against this background there were attempts to organize at a 
Pan-Islamic level to strengthen the Islamic world and to resist 
the West. It was an idea that was always at the mercy of the 
ambitions of the proposer of the moment. The initiative in the 
early 1880s came from the romantic Arabophile, W. S. Blunt, who 
wanted to do for the Arabs what Byron had done for the Greeks; he 
suggested the founding of a Muslim Congress to elect an Arab to 
replace the Ottoman caliph. The idea was taken up by Afghani, 
though not with its anti-Ottoman dimension, it was sustained in 
the circles around Muhammad `Abduh and Rashid Rida, and almost 
realized in Cairo in 1907 by the Crimean Tartar reformer, Isma`il 
Bey Gasprinski. After the First World War the Turks toyed with 
the idea of holding a congress to elect a caliph to replace the 
Ottoman holder of the office.  Then the first two congresses were 
actually held in 1924 and 1926 with this aim in mind. In the 
first, however, Sharif Husayn of Mecca found he could get no 
support for his claim, and in the second the Egyptians were 
rebuffed in their attempt to bring the office to Cairo. A third 
congress was held at Mecca in the summer of 1926 where Ibn Sa`ud 
faced such strong criticism of his custodianship of the holy 
places that he was put off such meetings for good.  A further 
Congress was held at Jerusalem in 1931 by Hajji Amin al-Husayni 
with the idea of winning support for the Palestinian cause.  This 
established a secretariat which existed for some five years.  
From then on no major Muslim congress was held until the 
establishment of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in 
1969 by Saudi Arabia in the wake of a serious fire in Jerusalem's 
al-Aqsa mosque. The charter of the Conference echoes several of 
the themes of the earlier congresses: the protection of the 
Muslim holy places, support for the Palestinian cause, and the 
fostering of Muslim solidarity in relation to the rest of the 
world. The issue of the Caliphate, however, is ignored.(26) 
     A supra-state vision also existed in the idea of Arab unity. 
 This had its origin in the first stirrings of Arab nationalism 
before the First World War. Hopes had been raised by British 
support for Sharif Husayn during the War and by the establishment 
of an Arab state at Damascus in 1918.  They were dashed by the 
state system imposed upon the region by the Allies in the post-
war settlement. Ideas of Arab unity revived during the inter-war 
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period with the writings of Sati al-Husri, a former Ottoman 
official, and the establishment of the Pan-Arab National Covenant 
in 1931. They gained extra momentum during the Second World War, 
as the British declared themselves in favour of unity to win Arab 
support, as it became the declared policy of the Baath party, and 
as the Arab League came to be formed in 1945.  They were 
stimulated further by the Palestinian problem and by Egyptian 
determination to use pan-Arabism to exercise leadership in the 
region.  In the 1950s and 1960s, as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq sought 
strength in the world of super-power rivalries which had replaced 
the colonial era, there were attempted unions.  Invariably 
rivalries between states prevented success; failure to defeat 
Israel discredited such ideas altogether. Dreams of Arab unity 
foundered on the nation-state system in the Middle East which 
British Empire had done so much to create. 
 ***** 
     The impact of Britain's moment in the Muslim world demands 
more general assessment. It enabled, for instance, some Islamic 
sects to develop a global presence.  British policy, for 
instance, encouraged the Nizari Isma`ilis to migrate from India 
to East Africa where they participated in its economic 
development, becoming in the process a wealthy and highly 
educated community.  British patronage enabled the leaders of 
this sect, the Aga Khans, to recover their fortunes, stamp their 
authority on their followers, and become figures in world 
affairs.  In a rather different way the connections of British 
Empire enabled the Ahmadiyya to carry their proselytising mission 
to East and West Africa in the 1920s. Now, despite the bitter 
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hostility of the rest of the Muslim community, they have missions 
in 120 countries. 
     British Empire presided over a more general expansion of the 
Muslim world.  Through sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, although 
the British brought an end to warlike expansion, apart from 
special cases like the southern Sudan, it provided an environment 
in which peaceful expansion could continue to take place as 
Muslims spread from the hinterland towards the coast in West 
Africa or from the coast inland in East Africa in search of jobs 
and commercial opportunities. As Muslims, moreover, competed with 
Christian missionaries for pagan souls, they had the advantage of 
promoting a faith which was different from that of the dominant 
white man. Economic opportunity brought further expansion of the 
Muslim world elsewhere.  Thus Indian Muslims using the 
opportunities provided by indentured labour came to form 
communities in the Caribbean.  Then, too, Muslims in large part 
from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and East Africa, came to 
fashion that most distinctive of Imperial legacies, the Muslim 
community of Britain. Urdu, Bengali, and Gujarati became British 
tongues, Islamic issues became part of British political 
discourse, and the domes of purpose-built mosques began to 
punctuate the skylines of cities such as London, Birmingham, and 
Bradford. 
     Through the length and intensity of their encounter with 
Britain, Muslims from South Asia came to the fore in the Islamic 
world in terms of new ideas and organization. They had been 
moving in this direction in the eighteenth century, but the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw a period of great 
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creativity.  Indian reformism gave birth in 1928 to what is 
regarded in the late twentieth century as the most widely 
followed movement in the Muslim world, the Tablighi Jama`at or 
`Preaching Society'.  Indian modernism produced Iqbal whose 
influence has been felt far beyond the subcontinent.  The figure 
of Mawdudi towers over the development of Islamism. While it was 
in Pakistan that there has been the most prolonged attempt to 
build a bridge between understandings of Islam and the 
requirements of modern society and state.  Under British rule 
Islam in South Asia became less a receiver of influences from 
elsewhere in the Muslim world and more of a transmitter.  This 
helped shift the centre of gravity of the Muslim world eastwards 
a process which is reinforced as East and South-East Asia become 
the economic powerhouse of the planet. 
     Overall strategies of British Empire helped to shape much of 
the state system of the modern Muslim world, and left key issues 
to bedevil subsequent development, amongst them the problem of 
Palestine, the relationship of the Gulf states to their larger 
neighbours and the role of Islam in the identity of modern states 
from West Africa to Malaya. Styles of rule gave shape to internal 
politics from the problems of civil war in Nigeria and the Sudan, 
through to the division of India at independence and the 
significance of the military in Jordan. The British, along with 
other European empires, enabled Islam to spread more widely than 
ever before. In the process Britain became in part Muslim 
herself. 
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